Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 TOKYO 11085 01 OF 02 291355Z

46

ACTION EA-14

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SAJ-01 OMB-01 ACDA-19 NIC-01 EUR-25

AEC-11 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10

PA-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SS-15 USIA-15 RSR-01 /142 W $\,$

----- 084196

R 291100Z AUG 73 FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6356 INFO DOD WASHDC JCS WASHDC CINCPAC HONOLULU HI COMUSJAPAN FUCHU JAPAN AMCONSUL NAHA

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 1 OF 2 TOKYO 11085

E.O. 11652: GDS TAGS: MARR JA

SUBJECT: FIFTH SECURITY CONSULTATIVE GROUP MEETING -- AUGUST 20, 1973

SUMMARY: FIFTH MEETING OF SCG FOCUSED ON JAPANESE
CONCEPTIONS OF SECURITY THREAT, NATURE OF DETERRENCE
AND SOMEWHAT ON US ROLE AS PARTNER WITH JAPAN. COMMENTS
BY JAPANESE PARTIIPANTS SEEMED FORTHRIGHT, AND IT WAS
CLEAR FROM DEMURRALS BY SOME THAT VIEWS PRESENTED WERE
PERSONAL AND THAT DISCUSSION WAS REACHING OUTER LIMITS
OF CONVENTIONAL JAPANESE CONCEPTS OF SECURITY AND
DEFENSE. PRESS TREATMENT OF MEETING WAS LIGHT, AND
SUBSTANCE OF PRINCIPAL DISCUSSIONS WAS NOT LEAKED. END SUMMARY.

1. ON AUGUST 20, 1973, FIFTH SECQSITY CONSULTATIVE GROUP MEETING WAS HELD AT FONOFF WITH REGULAR PARTICIPANTS ATTENDING. DISCUSSION WAS CONTINUATION OF DISCUSSION AT PREVIOUS MEETING OF KUBO'S PAPER ON PROBLEMS FOR JAPANESE DEFENSE POLICY. IN RESPONSE TO US QUESTION OF HOW GOJ PERCEIVES SECURITY THREAT, GENERAL NAKAMURA REPLIED THAT GOJ LOOKS FIRST AT CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 TOKYO 11085 01 OF 02 291355Z

CAPABILITY OF OTHER COUNTRIES TO PRESENT A SECURITY

THREAT TO JAPAN AND SECONDLY AT INTENTION. FROM ANALYSIS OF CAPABILITIES, JAPANESE SECURITY THREAT STEMS, IN ORDER, FROM USSR, PRC AND NORTH KOREA. NAKAMURA DESCRIBED CAPABILITIES OF BOTH PRC AND NORTH KOREA AS LIMITED BUT INDIRECTLY THREATENTING TO JAPAN'S SECURITY BY THEIR ABILITY TO ATTACK SOUTH KOREA. REGARDING INTENTIONS. NAKAMURA SAID THAT THERE AT PRESENT NO RPT NO FELT THREAT IN JAPAN OF INVASION BUT THAT INDIRECT THREASTS, WHICH HE DESCRIBED AS POLITICAL/MILITARY MIX, EXIST. HE DESCRIBED SUCH POLITICAL/MILITARY THREATS AS INCLUDING INSURGENCY AND BLACKMAIL, AS WELL AS MORE SUBTLE PRESSURES AND SAID THAT THE DEGRAQ OF SUCH THREATS CONSTANTLY VARIES.

2. MR KUBO SAID THAT HE DETECTED IRRITATION OF US AT LOW LEVEL OF GOJ DEFENSE PREPAREDNESS. HE SAID

THAT SUCH IRRITATION PROBABLY STEMS FROM USG-GOJ DIFFERENCES OF APPROACH TO SECURITY PROBLEM. HE

REFERRED TO RECENT REMARKS BY PRIME MINISTER TANAKA IN DIET TO EFFECT THAT THERE NOW NO RPT NO NUCLEAR THREATFROM PRC. JDA DIRGEN YAMANAKA THOUGHT THAT TANAKA MAY BE REACTING TO PRIVATE STATEMENT BY CHAU EN-LAI THAT PRC WOULD NOT USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGAINST JAPAN; BUT, KUBO OBSERVED, LEADERS CHANGE. FURTHERMORE, YAMANAKA INDICATED HE CONCERNED THAT USSR LEADERSHIP MIGHT GIVE SIMILAR ASSURANCES TO TANAKA, AND IF THESE TAKEN AT FACE VALUE THEN IT COULD BE ARGUED THAT THERE NO NEED FOR US NUCLEAR UMBRELLA. KUBO SAID THAT YAMANAKA INTENDED CAUTION TANAKA ABOUT THIS MATTER.

3. KUBO THEN DESCRIBED ESSENCE OF SECURITY ISSUE AS THAT OF LINKIHE INTENTIONS AND CAPABILITIES, BUT INTENTION IS DIFFICULT TO PERCEIVE AND (AS INDICATED ABOVE) SUBJECT TO CHANGE. THEREFORE, KUBO SAID THAT THREAT ANALYSIS SHOULD PROCEED FROM EXAMINATION OF CAPABILITY AND OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF SITUATIONS WHICH MIGHT PERMIT OR ENCOURAGE THE USE OF MILITARY POWER. CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 TOKYO 11085 01 OF 02 291355Z

HE SAID THAT IF ALL KNOWN FACTORS ARE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT, OVER NEXT TEN YEARS USSR PROBABLY WILL NOT ATTACK JAPAN. ACCORDINGLY, GOJ COULD AFFORD MAINTAIN RELATIVELY SMALL MILITARY DETERRENCE UNTIL SUCH TIME AS GOJ ESTIMATE OF PROBABILITY SHOULD ALTER. IN THAT CASE, JAPAN WILL SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASE ITS ARMAMENT. KUBO CONTRASTED DIFFERENCES OF APPROACH BETWEEN "FIRST RANK" MILITARY POWERS (US, WEST EUROPE)

AND "MIDDLE RANK" (JAPAN) TO SECURITY ISSUES. FIRST RANK POWERS HAVE RESOURCES SUFFICIENT TO BASE SECURITY ANAYLYSIS ON POSSIBILITY OF ATTACK BY OTHERS WHILE MIDDLE RANK POWERS, WITH NO HOPE OF MATCHING MILITARY CAPABILITY OF OTHERS, MUST PLAN ON BASIS OF PROBABILITY OF ATTACK. GENERAL NAKAMURA AGREED WITH KUBO'S ANALYSIS BUT OBSERVED THAT IT IMPOSSIBLE TO DECIDE WITH CERTAINTLY WHEN POSSIBILITY FADES INTO PROBABILITY. HE SAID THAT UNIFORMED MILITARY MUST TAKE ITS LEAD FROM POLITICIANS, WHO SHOULD BE ONE TO DECIDE. HE SUGGESTED THAT USG AND GOJ TOGETHER SHOULD ATTEMPT TO SPECIFY THE POSSIBILITY AND PROBABILITY OF EACH KIND OF SECURITY THREAT, RANGING FROM LOW LEVEL INSURGENCY TO NUCLEAR WARFARE.

- 4. GENERAL PURSLEY SAID THAT, GIVEN IMPORTANCE OF CAPABILITY FACTOR IN DETERMINING EXISTENCE OF THREAT, ANALYSTS SHOULD CONCLUDE THAT THREAT IN ASIA IS INCREASING SINCE FORCES OF USSR, PRC, AND NORTH KOREA ALL ARE INCREASING. PARTICULARLY AS BALANCED AGAINST DECREASING US CAPABILITIES IN ASIA, OVERALL IMBALANCE OF A CAPABILITY IS GROWING. KUBO ACKNOWLEDGED THAT FACT BUT SAID THAT ONLY POSSIBILITIES FOR INVASION WERE IN KOREA AND SOUTHEAST ASIA ANDTHAT THERE ARE NO RPT NO CONDITIONS GIVING RISE TO INTENTION BY ANYONE TO ATTACK JAPAN.
- 5. MR SHOESMITH ASSERTED THAT DEFENSE ANALYSIS ALWAYS PROCEEDS FROM A MIX OF CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS. MR TOGO AGREED. SHOESMITH ASSERTED ALSO THT INTENTIONS TO ATTACK CAN BE DETERRED BY HAVING ARMED FORCES OF ONE'S OWN, THUS REDUCING PROBABILITY OF ATTACK. MOREOVER, SINCE DETERRENT FORCES ARE NOT RPT NOT MERELY CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 TOKYO 11085 01 OF 02 291355Z

THOSE OF A SINGLE COUNTRY, BUT INCLUDE THOSE OF OTHERS WITH WHOM A COUNTRY MAY BE ALIGNED, US (FIRST RANK) FORCES IN AND AROUND JAPAN ARE A PART OF JAPAN'S DETERRENCE, AND JAPANESE SECURITY SPECIALISTS SHOULD BEAR THAT IN MIND WHEN COMPARING JAPAN'S (MIDDLE RANK) OWN MODEST FORCES AGAINST THOSE OF OTHER FIRST RANK POWERS.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 TOKYO 11085 02 OF 02 291435Z

41

ACTION EA-14

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SAJ-01 OMB-01 ACDA-19 NIC-01 EUR-25

AEC-11 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10

PA-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SS-15 USIA-15 RSR-01 /142 W 084514

R 291100Z AUG 73 FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6357 INFO DOD WASHDC JCS WASHDC CINCPAC HONOLULU HI COMUSJAPAN FUCHU JAPAN AMCONSULSLAHA

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 2 OF 2 TOKYO 11085

6. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION, MR KUBO CLARIFIED THAT WHILE THERE NO PROBABILITY OF SOVIET DIRECT ATTACK AGAINST JAPAN, THERE IS CONTINUING THREAT OF INDIRECT POLITICAL/MILITARY ACTION AGAINST JAPAN, WHICH KUBO DESCRUBED AS RESULTING INEVITABLY FROM NATURE OF COMMUNISM. TOGO EXPRESSED SOME RESERVATIONS ABOUT KUBO'S VIEWS AND NOTED THAT JAPAN IS INTERESTED NOT ONLY IN THREATS AGAINST JAPAN BUT IN THREATS AGAINST OTHERS AS WELL. SHOESMITH SUGGESTED THAT FURTHER LINE OF INQUIRY MIGHT BE QUESTION OF WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES OR SITUATIONS OUTSIDE THE NORTHEAST ASIA AREA MIGHT BE CONSIDEREDSTO POSE A THREAT TO JAPAN'S SECURITY INTEREST.

7. AT END OF SESSION OKAWARA RAISED SR-71 ISSUE,
TO WHICH US SIDE RESPONDED IN ACCORDANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS
RECEIVED FROM DEPARTMENT (SR-71 DEVELOPMENTS
REPORTED BY SEPTEL). REGARDING OKINAWA BASE CONSOLIDATION
AND REALIGNMENT PROGRAM, OKAWARA REFERRED TO UNDEFINED
POLITICAL PRESSURES IN JAPAN FOR ANNOUNCEMENT OF
FACILITIES RELEASES EVEN BEFORE POSSIBLE SECURITY
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 TOKYO 11085 02 OF 02 291435Z

CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE MEETING IN NOVEMBER OR DECEMBER. US PARTICIPANTS FORCEFULLY REJECTED

SUGGESTION AS ONE WHICH WOULD INTERFERE WITH ONGOING EFFORTS TO DEVELOP COHERENT BASE CONSOLIDATION PACKAGE.

8. PRESS REPORTING OF MEETING MODERATE, AND PRESS MADE NO MENTION OF PRINCIPAL MATTERS DISCUSSED. PRESS DID CONTAIN BRIEF ACCOUNTS OF US REACTION TO SR-71 ISSUE AND PREDICTIONS THAT THERE WOULD BE OKINAWA BASE CONSOLIDATION PACKAGE BY END THIS CALENDAR YEAR. INGERSOLL

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994 Channel Indicators: n/a

Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

Concepts: NATIONAL SECURITY, COLLECTIVE SECURITY, MEETINGS, NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS, MILITARY CAPABILITIES

Control Number: n/a Copy: SINGLE Draft Date: 29 AUG 1973 Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960 Decaption Note: Disposition Action: RELEASED Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: elyme
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1973TOKYO11085

Document Number: 1973TOKYO11085
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00

Drafter: n/a Enclosure: n/a

Executive Order: GS POWERS

Errors: N/A Film Number: n/a From: TOKYO

Handling Restrictions: n/a

Image Path:

Legacy Key: link1973/newtext/t1973087/aaaaaeuy.tel Line Count: 233

Locator: TEXT ON-LINE Office: ACTION EA

Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL Original Handling Restrictions: n/a Original Previous Classification: n/a Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a

Page Count: 5

Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a Reference: n/a Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED

Review Authority: elyme

Review Comment: n/a Review Content Flags: Review Date: 07 NOV 2001

Review Event:

Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <07-Nov-2001 by martinml>; APPROVED <11-Dec-2001 by elyme>

Review Markings:

Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier: Review Referrals: n/a Review Release Date: n/a Review Release Event: n/a **Review Transfer Date:** Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a

Secure: OPEN Status: NATIVE

Subject: FIFTH SECURITY CONSULTATIVE GROUP MEETING -- AUGUST 20, 1973 SUMMARY: FIFTH MEETING OF SCG FOCUSED ON

TAGS: MARR, JA To: STATE

Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005